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THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP AND CULTURAL
CONTINGENCIES IN TOTAL QUALITY
MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Asbjorn Osland ·

This case study contmsts how leaders learn to build on existing cultural contingencies while
implementing total quality management (fQM) in a Central American context. The specific
contingencies discussed are high power distance in relation to the quality council and
a/Jocentrism in reference to the cross-functional quality action teams.
The approaches qftwo leade1:s are contrasted. One leader implements TQM interventions at
multiple levels ofthe organization simultaneously; his approach has a statistically significant
impact on employee attitudes. Another leader, in a different but comparable site, uses the
TQM program opportunistically to further his managerial agenda and proves ineffective in
changing employee attitudes.

S

ince culture reputedly accounts for more than tiny percent of the variance in managerial
behavior (Hofstede, 1980), a leader must build on the cultural contingencies of the
organizational setting when implementing organizational changes (Schein, 1992), such as total
quality management (TQM). In the Central American context, two cultural contingencies are
particularly imp011ant: high power distance-- the acceptance of unequal distribution of power
within social institutions (Hofstede, 1980) -- and in-groups within Latin collectivist societies,
which Ttiandis et al. (1988) rcfem~d to as allocentrism (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai &
Lucca, 1988).
Since TQM is predicated on high levels of employee involvement (Juran & Gryna, 1993;
Ishikawa, 1985), the organizational implications of high power distance must be understood.
At first glance, high employee involvement seems to be in coni1ict with high power distance
norms where both lenders and subordinates expect thnt only lenders will have the
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tmquestionable power to make decisions. Employees will find it more difficult to express their
views as equals with management, and leaders oilen find sharing power to be uncomfortable.
For example, the autonomy of quality councils, which provide guidance and support for the
TQM intervention (Sholtes, 1988) is sometimes Uu·eatened by the physical presence of top-level
leaders in a high power distance setting. Though U1ey may understand the importance of
granting autonomy to a quality council, they are likely to assume control, be it direct or
tmohtrusive (PelTOW, 1986), when the pruiicip1u1ts f1mmder or move in a direction unanticipated
by the leaders.
Allocentrism, U1e second cultmal contingency, is manifested in the Central American work
setting by strong departmental (in-group) loyalty and "we-they" attitudes and friction with other
departments (out-groups). Organizations often experience turf battles and intergroup tension
that does not lend itself to the cross-1\.mctional teamwork that is a hallmark of TQM.
As TQM generally entails changing the organizational culture, the role of the leader is
crucial to the success ofU1e intervention (Deming, 1986; Ishikawa, 1985; George, 1992; Juran
& Gryna, 1993). Within this conte:-;t, kaders must develop clear strategies for implementation.
Ishikawa ( 1985) refers to this as TQM policy deployment -- that is, consistent, explicit and
concrete quality policies dil11.1sed to all level::; of the organization. TQM policy deployment is
based on the leader's perception of the contingencies a!Tecting the implementation ofTQM.
The research question that guides this study is: How can leaders deal successfully with
existing cultural and organizational contingencies while implementing TQM, when this
innovation promotes behavior contrary to the organizational and national culture?
Since the research is based on grounded themy (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the empirical
data fi·om the participant observation phase enabled the author to operationalize the research
question into the following propositions:
( l) The leader is so prominent in a high power distance setting that he or she cannot
actively participate in a quality council.
(2) "Turtlsm" cru1 be overcome in cross-ftmctional quality action teams ifleaders build on
the cultural contingencies of high power distance and allocenhism in the organizational
change etlort to implement TQM.
(3) Conversely, the change e!Tort could falter if such cultural contingencies are ignored.
(4) TQM should he implemented through policy deployment at multiple levels of the
organization.
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METHODS
Resenrch Setting

The Tropical ExpCJJ1 Company is a family-controlled Nmih American based multinational
corporation with very extensive production operations in Latin America that produce a labor
intensive tropical export product, primarily fclr Nmih America and Europe. The company has
a century long history in Latin America. It is one of the four major players in the industry. The
two research sites (Bocagrande and Playa Negra, both production divisions) are economies-of
scale operations (approximately 5,500-6,000 employees each) located in the Central American
country ofMorazan --a fictitious name used to preserve the anonymity of the company. The
village-like, relatively closed environments around the production divisions create social
situations that are more e)o.:treme tlHlll those fmUld in most modem organizations. The distinction
between work and social roles in these isolated company towns is often blmTed.
TQM was generally welcomed at the administrative levels of the company but the general
managers were hesitant to difi'use it too quickly into the union ranks as they feared tl1e union
leaders would perceive it as a Machiavellian ploy to subveti the political solidarity of the union.
Thus, the present research covers only the salaried persmmel and their involvement with TQM.
Ethnographic Methodology

I was a pmiicipant observer !l·om May 28, 1990 until July 23, 1992; I served as the human
resources manager for the company in the country of Morazan. As an expatriate American
citizen who had spent close to seven years in Latin America, tlrst with Peace Coq)s and then as
a manager of a development project, I was i1uent in Spanish. At the time I took the job with the
Tropical Expoti Company, I was a doctoral candidate in organizational behavior. I spent
approximately one third of my time in Playa Negra, a third in Boca grande, and a third in the
capital city office, with some time at Packaging, Inc., a subsidiary of the Tropical Export
Company tl1at produced production and packaging material for Playa Negra and Bocagrande.
As a pmiicipm1t obsetver m1d stair executive reporting to the same vice president as the general
managers of Playa Negra and Bocagrande, I attended staff meetings, conversed with the
employees, conducted over 150 intctviews, spoke frequently with cmvorate visitors from the
U.S., m1d interacted socially wiU1 the residents of Playa Negra and Bocagrande who worked for
the company.
Survey Instrument

The second phase ofU1e research involved the development of a questionnaire to measure
organizational changes in relation to the TQM program. This instrument was translated by an
educated native speaker fi·om tl1c region and revised by two bilingual educated individuals. The
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questionnaire consisted of the relevant portions of the Socio-teclmical Systems Benchmark
Sw-vey (Sabiers & Pasmore, 1992), several questions specifically developed for the survey, and
an instrument to measure organizational commitment (Mowday, Steers & Porter, 1979).
The Sabiers and Pasmore instrument consists of twenty scales used to measure the degree
to which an organization follows sociotechnical systems design principles. Each scale or
variable consists of a series of questions that yielded intemally consistent responses (i.e.,
Cronbach alpha greater U1ru1 .66). The instnm1ent utilizes a Like1i scale of I (strongly disagree)
to 5 (strongly agree). An example of the questions used follows: "lnf01mation about my
department's objectives is shared with me." The variables that proved reliable in this study
appear below.

Inclusion: This vruiable measures perceptions relating to the extent to which one interacts
with other levels ru1d departments of the orgru1ization, is privy to financial and objectives related
information, understands how decisions are made, and feels like a partner who is heard.
Supportfor innovation: This scale measures perceptions relating to good ideas being put
into practice, being encouraged to tJy new ways of doing things, and being rewarded for coming
up with new ideas.
Facilitative leadership: This scale focuses on receiving clear feedback, messages, and
guidance fl·om one's superior plus the autonomy to figure out best how to work.

Coope1·ation: This relates to assistance tJ·om co-workers.
Upward influence: This scale measures perceptions of how well the supervisor listens to
one's opinions, so!icil'l advice, and whether or not the subordinate is consulted on job changes.
Activity feedback: This variable measures one's perceptions of feedback from others
regarding the quality of one's work as well as the ability to give feedback to others.

The questions developed for U1e sluvey measlu·ed group etTicacy (i.e., one's attitudes toward
working in groups), positive attitude toward TQM, and positive view toward one's superior.
Again, the respondents utilized a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). An
example of the questions used follows: "When I talk to those who are involved in the TQM
groups, I find that they seem enthusiastic about TQM."
The organizational commitment measure also used a Like1i scale but measured from I
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). An example of the questions used follows: "I talk up
this organization to my friends as a great organization to work for."
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Selection of Survey Subj ccts

The results of the implementation of TQM in Playa Negra were contrasted with the results
in Bocagrande by looking for ~ignilicant di!Jerences between the TQM participants with the
non-participants.
The subjects in Playa Negra were divided into two groups, those involved in TQM (n=47)
and those uninvolved (n=45). This sample included all the pruiicipants in TQM, with the
exception ofthe members of the quality council. They were excluded because almost all the
executives were members of the quality council, making it impossible to match them with non
pruiiciprults at the same hierarchical level. The non-pmiicipant group was fonned by drawing
a random sample of comparable size and organizational level to match the TQM participants.

In Bocagrande, the subjects were also divided into comparable groups, TQM (n=33) and
non-TQM (n=37). Because fewer employees were involved in the TQM effcni here, it was
necessary as well as feasible to include subjects at the executive level. Two stratified random
samples of non-participants thm1 comparable levels of the organization were drawn from an
employment roster.
The two locations were similar in many respects. The etlmic makeup of the monthly
employees who responded to the survey was almost unifonnly Latin with the exception of the
European general manager in Bocagrande, Karl. Both general managers, several department
heads, and some lower level monthly employees had worked in both locations. The
technologies employed in both locations were essentially the same. The demographics of the
subjects from Playa Negra and Bocagrnnde are shown in Table I.

RESULTS
Ethnographic

TI1e case sh1dy was ru1 eJT01i to build grounded the01)' (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) around the
role of leadership in the implementation of TQM. The impacts of the different managerial styles
of the two leaders regru·ding employee involvement in the two locations were contrasted through
qualitative data recorded during the participant observation phase and, later, a survey and
follow-up interviews. I labeled the diiTerent TQM implementation approaches used by the
leaders policy deployment (i.e., Anmmdo 's approach) versus managerial opportunism (i.e.,
Kru·J's approach). The contrasts between the managerial styles of the two managers are shown
in Table 2.
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Armando & Policy Deployment
Armando, the general manager of Playa Negra, is native to that community. His father
-provided services to the company. Almando was educated in the U.S. and completed a degree
in the sciences. He began working for U1e company in a research capacity but moved to
production where he spent his entire career of more than 25 years. He has highly developed
political skills and charismatic leadership qualities. He is a large fit man who strikes an
imposing image. He combines an engaging manner with total authority; one can speak frankly
with him and challenge him with well founded arguments yet one is always aware of his
authority. His talents are in production, including labor relations, and general leadership. He
pennits the support functions (e.g., the controller's office and materials) considerable autonomy
as long as policy is followed, budgets respected, and targets met. He handles the human
resource functions for key people himself in terms of career development and succession
planning and tends to plan and then offer options to subordinates, rather than converse with
them to detem1ine how they see their careers developing.
Annando derives his power fi·om the supp01i the organizational culture gives to the role
of the general manager, the national culture's perception of power distance, and his ability to
create and deploy policy. His fom1er controller in Playa Negra stated, "Annando does half the
work of a controller in that he makes people follow the rules and is very cost conscious." Others
who work with Almando also describe him as predictable. The methodical and deliberate
approach he has adopted to TQM policy deployment is consistent with the approach he has
taken in implementing other programs in the past.
Karl & Managerial Opportunism
Karl, the general manager ofBocagrande, was bom in the Caribbean and spent his early
years in another Central Al11erican production division where his father worked. His
background was clearly rooted in the neo-colonial history of the company, so much so that Karl
did not become highly fluent in Spruush though he had resided in Latin America for much of his
life; he understood Spruush and could make himself understood in poor Spanish. Karl attended
boarding school in Europe where he was eventually educated as a military officer. He spent
several years in a war zone, !ell the military, and eventually went to work for the Tropical
Export Company. It is very conm1on for executives to an·ange for one or more of their children
to be employed by the company. Nepotism is one of the bonds that holds the organizational
culture together. Karl worked in many different locations including Playa Negra before his
promotion to the general manager's slot in Bocagrande. Karl is very effective during crises,
perhaps in prui due to Ius militruy background. He said the only remaining disaster that had not
touched Boca grande during his tenure was a volcanic eruption. Karl is described by his
subordinates with the English word "pusher," meaning one who gets things done through an
insistence on task completion.
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Table I
Demogl'll(lhics of Survey Particin:mh

..

l!lillD ~Util

!!!l!!

TOM

Non-TOM

!!!l!!

TOM

Non-TQM

Production

44

22

22

28

9

19

Controller's office

12

5

7

12

3

9

Matenals

9

4

5

3

-

3

Engineering

9

3

6

9

7

2

Legal

-

-

-

I

-

I

TramporU!tion/exp.

5

3

2

4

3

I

General Manager's office

1

-

1

5

5

Quality control

7

7

3

Packaging

2

2

-

-

Labor relations

2

-

2

5

3

3

Reswch

I

I

-

-

-

-

91

47

45

70

33

37

0-5

5

I

4

4

2

2

6-10

25

14

II

13

6

7

11-15

24

13

II

15

6

9

16·20

10

4

6

II

6

5

More than 20

25

13

12

24

12

12

Missing infom>ntion

1

2

I

1

I

_2

92

47

45

70

33

37

18-25

1

-

I

3

I

2

26-35

37

23

14

IS

5

10

36-45

34

16

18

30

17

13

Over45

17

8

9

16

7

9

Missing infom1ation

1

3

6

1

3

Department

Total

l:m!!!! Service

Total

S!

91

47

45

70

33

37

Male

84

46

38

67

31

36

Female

8

I

7

1

2

I

92

47

45

70

33

37

Assistant foremen!unsldlled

7

I

6

I

0

I

Foremen

31

15

16

2

-

2

Sldlled technician

13

7

6

14

5

9

Unit manager/assistant

30

18

12

7

I

6

Supervisor/professional

10

5

5

31

14

11

-

-

15

13

2

-

-

-

45

70

33

37

Total
~

Total
0£!!1e•llonal L•v•l

Department hend!mannger
Missing infomlntion

I

Total

92

L

"
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Table 2
Managerial Opportwusm versus PoUcy Deployment Strategies for Implementing Total Quality
M anaecmcnt

Factor

Observations Relating Factor to
Managerial Opportunism
(Bocagrnnde)

Observations Relating Factor to
Policy Deployment (Playa Negra)

Description of implementation
process:

Managers in council developed
consensus view ofTQM priorities
and implementation strategy
before pushing it downward

Massive training and
implementation of quality action
teams concurrent with consensus
building process in council.

General manager's role:

General manager coopted council
to force preferential treatment of
his proposals

Gen. manager allowed council to
develop autonomous consensus
while pushing basic TQM
downward.

Initial policy deployment:

Limited to preparing council &
f.'lcilitators

TQM introduction, leadership
training. prob. solving within
functional teams. Pushed by GM
through internal coordinator.

General change in employee
involvement:

None until manager's council was
prepared to d ilfuse TQM to the
lower levels of the hierarchy.

Employees involved in functional
teams in established units so
hierarchy was not threatened.
Datnbased dialogue used within
esL'\blished patterns.

Impact of department
heads/supervisors:

Socialized dept. heads allowed
general manager to co-opt council.

Dept. heads were unable to
cooperate without leadership.
Turf consciousness precluded
cross functional teams. Quality
council did not develop autonomy.

Risks for general manager:

Easy to slip into autocratic
behavior. Socialization of
department heads in quality
council caused them to look to the
general manager for guidance.
The more they depended on the
genernlmnnnger the less
autonomous they became.

GM risked alienating dept. heads
if he pushed to hard too fast at
lower levels. GM limited TQM
policy deployment at lower levels
to measures perceived by
department heads and superv'rs as
helping them.

Given his style ofpushing to get results, Karl was eager to implement the different project:
he envisioned -- so eager that he unabashedly manipulated the quality council into what h
called "a manager's council." He expressed discontent that some of the people on the counci
disagreed with him, so he "rotated" them ofithe council and replaced them with several of hi
direct repotis whom he could cotmt on for supp01i. Given the employee's willingness to acceJ
a high level ofdirect control fi·om the general manager, Karl's actions are by no means unusua

71

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT
However, his subordinates complain about his inconsistency from one day to the other but
accept it as the general manager's prerogative.
Karl could be characterized as one who was deeply concerned for the welfare of his
employees, consistent with tl1e patemalistic background oftl1e company. The otl1er side ofiliis
paternalism was the command and control orientation of the expatriate managers. Karl's
military backgrmmd and his family's roots in tl1e neocolonial past of the company probably both
contributed to his conunand and control orientation and desire for direct control.
Karl had grown up within the company and as an adult worked in remote locations for more
than 15 years; he was strongly socialized to the company town culture found in the production
divisions and therefore somewhat insular. In contrast to Annando, who attempted to develop
social contacts outside the company, Karl spent most of his fi·ee time with company employees
or contractors. Though ve1y capable and intellectually gifted, Karl's insularity made him
somewhat resistant to change. Though he understood TQM, he continued to exhibit the strong
direct control general managers always had. Managerial opportunism resulted.
ObservntionsNigncttes

The direct control (i.e., orders issued by the powerful -- Pen·ow, 1986) of the general
managers was significant. It was based on the power given to the position by the company and
the cultural emphasis 011 high power distance. Historically, the general managers had always
been expatriates and operated in relatively isolated locations managing operations that faced
great unce1iainty in tenns of govemmental and union relations and production conditions.
These high levels of unee1ininty, coupled with the neocolonialist orientation of tl1e company,
gave the role of the general manager great power over the employees and others dependent on
the company. For example, one Spanish businessman stated that many years ago he bought the
first car owned by a "civilian" (i.e., non-company resident) in Bocagrande. When it was
delivered 011 the company train, the general manager initially refused to allow it to be unloaded
saying he hadn't given his authorization. Thus, t11e general manager had been and continued to
be seen as a very powerf11l figure within the company towns.
High power distance continued to be evident in the relationships between superiors and
subordinates. Superiors commonly expressed the need to dominate subordinates. For example,
a subordinate, a professional, threatened to quit if he did not receive a raise in his salmy to
increase it to a level compm·able to that of other employees at his level. His manager swore the
human resources manager to secrecy and snid, "Julian is ve1y good." The inference was that
subordinates should not be told by their superiors how valuable they were because such
knowledge would give them power. For another depmiment head, hierarchy was more than
simple power associated with a senior position. It had a raw element to it wherein his authority
could not be questioned. He e:-:pressed the explicit desire that his subordinates fear him. His
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preference for primitive domination was extreme but such a desire for control over subordinates
was not unusual in the corporate culture. He actually asked ti1e human resources manager (i.e.,
the author) to do a survey feedback of his depm1.ment to find out if his subordinates held a
sufficient degree offear for him. Some of the more interesting stories came out as people stood
around the bar in the evenings discussing how the Americans had been very strict in the past,
in the neo-colonial era before 1970. One relatively uneducated individual who had become a
senior level manager related how he had leamed English; he said, "It was easy. My boss said,
'No Spanish'!"
By reviewing some of the qualitative data regarding the TQM implementation process,
obtained through pmticipant observation, one can better understand how policy deployment, as
implemented in Playa Negra by Armando, had a more beneficial impact than the managerial
opportllllism ofKm'l.

Involvement of the Leaders With the Quality Councils
Both general managers had attended seminars where they were taught that TQM practices
involved employee involvement and relative autonomy for the quality council, the group
appointed to guide the TQM process. Part of Annando's understm1ding of the process was that
he should not inte1vene in the quality cow1cil's activities. He used his understanding of the need
for an autonomous council to restrain himself in the quality council meetings he attended. His
actions were guided by the policy he had deployed, which included autonomy for the council.
He was able to avoid the culturally induced reflex of directing the activities of the council
because he had adopted a policy toward TQM. This policy became a cognitive road map that
he followed.
The cotmcil proved capable of taking some initiative after 18 months of marginal activity,
but this break1.1u·ough occulTed only after Annando finally ordered them to remain in the room
lllltil they developed a plan to make the quality council etTective in its leadership ofTQM. His
direct control was consistent with the style of leadership practiced in Morazan, but he removed
himself:fi:om the discussion to foster U1e autonomy he perceived as essential for a quality council
within TQM. After his departure, the quality council chose to replace the ineffectual leader of
the quality cotmcil, a young expatriate controller, with the second-in-conunand, the production
manager.
An outsider might wonder how there could be such a difference between the power of the
general manager and the second-in-command. The second-in-ctmunand was highly respected
hut not feared in the same way as the general manager. There can only be one maximum
authority in U1e hierm·chy, embedded in U1e high power distance Latin society, of the production
division. The individual filling that role deals with most of ti1e decisions required to resolve
uncertainty, a basic source of power within organizations (Crozier, 1964).
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In contrast to the policy deployment of A1111ando, Karl, the general manager ofBocagrande
chose to co-opt the quality council and use it to oppotiunistically pursue his own agenda for the
division. Given the organizational members' willingness to accept a high level of direct control
from the general manager, his actions were by no means unusual. He told me that the council
was a "manager's council" that he controlled. He related one anecdote to the author regarding
the control of the cognitive premises for action, an example of an unobtrusive control described
by Perrow (1986). Those who achieved the rank of depmiment head were usually very skillful
at organizational politics; they gave ample consideration to what they perceived the desires of
the general manager to be. According to Karl, "Even if I ask a question, they are trying to guess
what's on my mind."

Another example of the power of the control over the cognitive premises for action in a
high power distance setting was found in a packaging subsidiat}' of the Tropical Export
Company, which was not swveyed due to its dissimilar context-- it was an urban manufacturing
facility lead by professional engineers. The general manager was asked by his second-in
command, the head of the quality council, not to attend the council meetings until the members
had a specific proposal to present to him. His second-in-command believed that if the general
manager were present he would unduly sway the council, thereby precluding genuine
pwticipation. Simple questioning on the part of the general manager was enough to influence
the COUI1cil members because they would attempt to detem1ine what it was the general manager
WU!lted and then tailor their comments and suggestions accordingly. Although the second-in
command still possessed a great deal of authority, he was not accorded the same deference as
the general manager.
Thus, in reference to the 1irst proposition, one could conclude that the leader is too
prominent in such high power distance settings to be able to effectively pmticipate in a quality
council.
Allocentrism and Cross Functional Teams

The traditional importw1ce given to hicrw·chy and "turf" made it difticult to introduce cross
fi.mctional teams in Playa Negra nnd Bocagrande. Allocentrism, with its emphasis on in-groups,
fosters the turfism that TQM is to break down through cross functional teams.
Depmtmcnt heads and supetvisors were regularly described by their subordinates in the
production divisions as people to 1em·. Subordinates found it di11icult to interact with peers from
other departments when they were unsure about what their supervisor or depmtment head
desired. Tllis demm1d fi·om supetiors for personal loyalty from their subordinates, coupled with
allocentrism, constrained cross functional problem solving in both the production divisions.
Ignoring these cultural contingencies and attempting to impose cross functional teams too soon
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caused the TQM implementation process to falter initially in Playa Negra, confim1ation of
proposition tlu·ee.
The TQM coordinator in Playa Negra related how they addressed tl1is problem. After
encountering initial resistance, the general manager, Annando, advised him not to push
interdepru1mental problem solving quite so aggressively; instead he suggested limiting ilie
problem solving teams to depm1ments until the department heads became more accepting.
Later, A.n11ando instructed him to adopt the following hybrid solution, which ilie TQM
coordinator described as:
A key operations manager was assigned a quality problem. He was fuen
empowered to choose the members of his or her team which included people
from other depm1ments. These people met and analyzed fue specific problem.
Significant improvements in quality outcomes resulted. The market feedback has
been very positive.
Allowing respected individuals to name their own team members builds upon the cultural
value of traditional respect for leaders. The team leaders named people they felt were
trustworthy and competent with regard to tl1e problem to be solved and with whom they enjoyed
mutual respect. Though tl1e team members came fi·om vrnious depm1ments, they found conunon
ground in their strong relationships with the team leader as well as their perceived competency
relating to tl1e problem under study. Thus, this solution succeeded because it was compatible
witl1 existing cultural values conceming leadership (i.e., high power distance), hard work and
loyalty, and took into consideration the strong sense of in-group feeling (i.e., allocentrism) as
well as the competence of the individuals chosen. AI111ando's awareness of these culturally
based unobtrusive controls facilitated the TQM implementation process, thereby confirming
proposition two. One must recall tl1at Amwndo was native to the culture whereas Karl was not;
it is logical that Annando would devise a culturally astute means of implementing cross
:fi.mctional teams tl1at promoted TQM while not asking the participants to stray too far from their
cultural assumptions.

Quantitative

1

Policy deployment at multiple levels of the organization proved more effective than
managerial oppo111uusm. This was tested by contrasting the pm1icipants of the TQM program
with the non-pru1iciprn1ts in both Playa Negra and Boca grande. Since the samples were small,
witl1 non-nomml disi.Jibutions, nonprn·rn11CI.Jic tests were used. The means were ranked for each
oftl1e variables using the Kruskal- Wallis test. The median test was also employed to contrast
the TQM rn1d non-TQM groups using tl1e stuvey vrn·iables previously discussed; it ranked cases
above and below the median. In the case of Playa Negra, the TQM pm1icipants were
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significantly differentiated fi·om the non-participants in te1ms of the following variables:
inclusion, upward influence, activity feedback, and attitude toward TQM, as shown in Table 3.
The results for Bocagrande (see Table 3) dillerentiated the TQM pmticipants from the non
participants only with regards to inclusion, which was higher for TQM pruticipants. Non
participants, however, rep01ted a higher level of organizational conunitment. None of the
Kruskai-Wallis tests were supported by significant results from the median tests. Since
nonpararnetric tests are fairly weak, the significant findings for the Kruskal-Wallis tests reported
for Bocagrande in Table 3 should be viewed with caution. Fmthennore, there are alternative
explanations for the significant findings in Bocagrandb that may be unrelated to TQM. For
example, inclusion may be higher for the TQM participants in Bocagrande because 13 of the
15 subjects in this group are at the bonus eligible level. They pmticipate in managerial decision
making because of their position, not their TQM involvement. Organizational conunitment
could have been higher for non-TQM respondents because the previously mentioned executives
are better educated and have more altematives outside of the organization. Thus their
dependency on the company may be weaker than those with little education who have more
limited employment altematives. Those with little education would have difficulty finding jobs
that paid more than the ones they held within the company. Therefore, we cmmot conclude that
TQM had an impact in Bocagrande, as measured by the survey results repmted in Table 3.
In conclusion, Almando, the leader in Playa Negra, simultaneously focused on multiple
levels of the organization tlu·ough TQM policy deployment. The preceding statistical results
from Table 3 show that Am1ando's policy deployment had an impact. In contrast, Karl's
managerial opportunism (i.e., first aligning the quality council with the leader's perception of
TQM) did not have a comparably significant impact. One could asse1t that Karl really had not
implemented TQM but rather his perception of how TQM techniques could serve his agenda-
i.e., managerial opportunism. The greater success of policy deployment versus managerial
opportunism confinns proposition four.

DISCUSSION
Ethnogrnphic
The conceptual implications for practice point to the necessity of acknowledging and
building upon cultural and organizational contingencies. If high power distance is prominent,
one cannot expect a quality council to assume an autonomous role if the general manager or
leader is present --even as a silent observer. On the other hand, relatively leaderless groups
were also incapable ofilmctioning ellcctively. Using the second-in-conunand to lead the quality
council seems to satisiy the need for leadership as well as allowing the quality council members
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to feel relatively fi·ee to express their views, thereby fostering a measure of autonomy essential
to the quality council within TQM.

Table 3
Sienilicant OifTucn.-es Retwecn TQI\1 and Non-TQI\1 Rl.'spontlcnts
Playa Negra
Kruoka~WalllsNonparamelrk

Variables: lnclu•lon

Test

Upward lnOuence

Activity Feedback

Attitude Toward TQM

Mean!l!.!!!>

t!

M.!ll!!l Il!.!!!>

t!

Mean!l!.!!!>

t!

M.!ll!!l Il!.!!!>

t!

lnTQM

52.78

46

55.49

47

51.81

47

54.31

47

Nolin
TQM

39.07

45

37.11

45

39.8

44

38.34

45

(X'-6.18; p=.O 129)

(X'=II.OI; p=.0009)

<x'=4.74; p=.0295)

<x'=8.33; p=.0039)

Playa Negra
Median Nonparametrlt- Test
Variables:

AHU11de Toward TQM

llpV13rd Innuence

A<livlly Feedback

>Median

<Me<lian

>Median

<Median

>Median

<Median

lnTQM

22

25

28

19

26

21

NotinTQM

II

34

15

29

II

34

Meolian=3.33;
<x'=4.o7; p=.0436)

Meolian=3.33;
<x'=4.94; p=.0262l

Median-3.67;
(X'=7.88; p=.0050)

Bocagrande

KrusknJ..Walllr Nonparatnell'lc Test
Variables: Inclusion

Organlz.ailonal Commitment

~!D.!lk

t!

M.!ll!!l rnnk

t!

lnTQM

39.79

34

28.98

33

Nolin
TQM

30.34

35

39.7

35

(X'=3.85; p=.0499)

<x'=5.oo: p=.0254)

As indicated previously, Playa Negra initially followed conventional TQM methodology
and assigned cross functional teams. Allocentrism and "ttufism" hindered the effectiveness of
these groups so they resorted to functional teams, much like quality circles. When Armando
realized that 1mmy orgmlizational problems were of a cross functional nature, he encouraged the
quality council to have respected managers lead the quality action teams and choose their own
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members. This solution is consistent with both high power distance and allocentrism, in that
a recognized leader is fi·ee to choose members fl'om his or her in-group. Such an in-group may
reflect personal loyalties fi·om vruious departments rather than functional area loyalties, thereby
permitting a cross functional approach to operate. This may be a way to avoid the resistance
initially faced when cross functional groups are imposed on organizational systems susceptible
to turfism; one achieves cross functional problem solving and conununication but in a culturally
sensitive manner.
Quantitative

Annando's policy deployment approach was effective because it was based on a cognitive
framework that considered the critical organizational and cultural contingencies and attempted
to change the organization at multiple levels simultaneously. This cognitive road map was
important in countering the strong cultural pull of autocratic leadership. The clarity and
consistency in TQM training ru1d quality action team activities fostered a more positive attitude
among participants than non-participants.
Annando realized that a cascading approach, fi·om top to bottom, would not produce the
desired chru1ge in that his immediate :-mbordinates, the depmiment heads and supervisors, would
likely be obstacles as they would see their power and autonomy tlu·eatened. Therefore, he did
not expect them to change rapidly. He cotTectly assumed that those at the lower levels would
prove very interested in TQM as it o!Tered them a chance to have more impact through
collaborative problem solving. On several occasions he was encouraged by consultants to press
his direct reports to take more initiative in the quality council and to be more accepting of cross
functional teams. However, he refused to be strongly assertive," I know I could beat them over
the bead and, like good soldiers, they'd do what I want. However, I could be transfen·ed at any
time and total quality would stop if they didn't assume ownership."
The other leadership approach observed in this study, managerial oppotiunism, did not
produce significant diiTerences that can be solely attributed to TQM training and patiieipation
in quality action teams. Oppoi1tmism created an ad hoe inconsistency that allowed
capriciousness to manifest itself as autocratic behavior (e.g., Karl's co-optation of the quality
council).
Therefore, one can conclude that a simultaneous focus on multiple levels of tl1e
organization through TQM policy deployment at various levels of the organization (i.e., the
saturation approach) was more e!Tective U1ru1 a cascading approach handicapped by managerial
opportunism. Table 3 shows the attitudinal di1Terences of the TQM pmiicipants, reflected in
terms of inclusion, upward influence, activity feedback, and positive attitude toward TQM, in
relation to non-TQM participants in Playa Negra. This was not the case. in Bocagrande.
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However, in a sense, Karl had not really implemented TQM but rather his perception of how
TQM techniques could serve his agenda, i.e., managerial opportunism.

Implications

Thus, the initial action steps one might suggest, in regard to cultural contingencies, when
implementing TQM are for the leader to first interpret the organizational and national culture
(Schein, 1992). Leaders should be sensitized to the culture of the specific location. The next
step is to realize that cultural continuity can be a foundation for innovation while providing a
satisfying envirorunent for the employees (Salipante, 1992; Fry & Srivastva, 1992). This
involves looking for solutions that incorporate cultural contingencies in a way that promotes
rather than hinders the implementation process; the leader needs to make effective use of
unobtrusive controls (Pen·ow, 1986), based on culture (e.g., Armando's cross functional teams)
in the implementation process. The leader also must understand that the itmovation needs to be
modified during the adoption process (Lewis & Seibold, 1993); an off-the-shelf or cookie-cutter
approach to innovation is especially risJ..-y when dealing with cultural contingencies.
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